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Dear friends! 
We are proud to present the Belarusian Foreign 
Political Index for the period encompassing April and 
May 2011, a survey assessing key trends in 
international relations engaging Belarus. In this issue 
we analyze as many as five Belarus’ foreign political 
vectors: the relations with the European Union, with 
Russia, and with China, with developing countries of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, and Belarusian 
relations with Ukraine.
April and May saw crucial events that had a major 
impact, among others, on the political life of the 
country. The trials of the participants in the December 
19 events, Minsk metro bombing, currency and 
economic crisis, and search for external financing…
The foreign political Wind Rose of that period clearly 
indicates a substantial “shrinkage” of the foreign 
political vectors. In other words, the Belarusian authorities see the room for 
foreign political maneuver narrowing, while self-isolation trends are growing more 
prominent. On the one hand, this may attest to more severe repressions inside 
the country, on the other hand, this provides an indication that the pendulum of 
Belarusian foreign policy will soon swing back towards the West. Some of the 
recent statements of the president seem to be paving the way for such a turn.
We wish you a pleasant reading and invite you to share your comments and 
suggestions to make the Index better and more interesting.
Dzianis Melyantsou
Editor of the Belarus’ Foreign Policy Index
 Yauheni Preiherman, Valieryja Kascjuhova, Andrei Skryba, 
Siarhei Bohdan, Dzianis Melyantsou
 Dzianis Melyantsou
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Russia: +5 (+15/-10)EU: -9 (+4/-13)
China: +4 (+4/0)Ukraine: 0 (+5/-5)
«Developing 
  countries»: +9 (+9/0)
Relations development indices:
In April and May, the Belarusian foreign political Wind Rose had an even fancier configuration than 
at the start of the year The Russian vector got shorter by as much as 15 points, enough for the 
negative European vector (-9) to absorb it. The newly introduced index of Belarus’ relations with 
Ukraine froze on the zero mark. The relations with China and “developing countries” have seen 
minor modifications. It looks like the notorious Belarusian “multi-vector foreign policy” continues its 
collapse
EU: -15 (+4/-19)
«Developing 
  countries»: +6 (+6/0)
Russia: +20 (+42/-22)
China: +3 (+3/0)
3Development of EU-Belarus relations
Description of the initial state of relations
Was the forecast made in the previous issue of the monitoring 
accurate?
Description of key events in the period
As was mentioned in the previous issue of the monitoring, the relations between the European 
Union and Belarus in the period January 1 through April 1, 2011 were marked by an explosive 
escalation of the conflict, which arose from the brutality demonstrated on the election day of 
December 19, 2010 and repressions that followed. The actions of the Belarusian authorities were 
slammed by the national governments and institutions of the European Union. However, their 
response to events in Belarus grew less enthusiastic as EU officials turned to practical steps from 
statements. Many observers considered the decision of the Council of the European Union to apply 
sanctions to a limited number of state officials responsible for human rights violations in Belarus to 
be a half-measure, especially given the original appeals of the European Parliament factions to 
impose radical measures.
In the first quarter of 2011, commodity trade turnover between Belarus and the EU reached USD 
4,769.2 million, which represents an increase of 57.5% from the same period in 2010. Belarus saw 
a trade surplus of USD 839.4 million.
The forecast we gave in the previous issue of the monitoring appeared to be accurate. The conflict 
between the EU and Belarus remained tense in the period April 1 to June 1 and the politically-
motivated sentences handed down on the participants and organizers of “mass riots” resulted in 
further escalations. The list of officials subject to EU sanctions was extended. The EU never slapped 
economic sanctions on Belarus, though, despite active discussions of possible economic measures 
at the level of national governments and institutions of the Union.
Our forecast that despite the escalating conflict, the EU and Belarus will start looking for ways to 
resolve it, also proved correct: some EU officials made statements about the need to resume the 
dialogue (they made it conditional upon immediate release of political prisoners, though), whereas 
President Aliaxander Lukashenka provided feedback by saying that political prisoners could be 
released soon enough. 
After the turmoil observed in January-March came a lull in terms of political decisions in EU-Belarus 
relations. That quiet period was frequently interrupted by regular statements of EU officials who 
condemned the trials of activists and sentences passed on “mass riot” cases. The sentences 
imposed on former presidential candidates naturally caused the most negative response. The topic 
of political repressions and especially the politically-motivated trials were regularly covered by the 
European media.
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4The Council of the European Union was supposed to convene on April 12 to address the 
“Belarusian issue” again. There appeared media reports that targeted economic sanctions might be 
slapped on some Belarusian enterprises, despite protests of some EU national governments. 
However, probably because of the Minsk metro tragedy of April 11, the Council of the EU chose to 
temporarily refrain from new decisions on Belarus. 
Late April was marked by the “Chernobyl case”: Lukashenka was not invited to a donor conference 
on April 19 and official events on April 26 timed to the anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, 
which took place in Ukraine. The media reported that the non-invitation of Lukashenka was a 
condition for President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso to come to Ukraine. 
When commenting on the situation, Lukashenka made use of terms clearly unacceptable in 
diplomatic procedures, which became a revelation to Europeans, who are definitely not used to 
Lukashenka’s parlance.
One of the most noteworthy events of the period in question was the inaugural meeting of 
Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, the parliamentary component of the Eastern Partnership, which 
took place on May 3 without Belarusian representatives. The European parliamentary platform thus 
launched its work without the “rogue delegation” even though talks with Minsk over the format of 
Belarus’ engagement had been conducted for two years. This Euronest case was nothing 
extraordinary amid the crisis status quo, but it predictably disgruntled the Belarusian authorities, 
which appear to have lost another channel to communicate with the European Union. 
The European Parliament on May 12 passed another resolution on Belarus calling for targeted 
economic sanctions against the Belarusian authorities. On the same day came shocking news that 
should the EU approve economic sanctions against Belarus, official Minsk would order some of the 
EU ambassadors out of the country and ban foreign trips for 200 opposition activists – a “source in 
the Belarusian Presidential Administration” was quoted. The information was later disavowed by 
the Belarusian Foreign Ministry. Nevertheless, the statement may be considered an example of 
outright diplomatic blackmail.
The Council of the European Union got back to the “Belarusian issue” on May 23 and added 13 
new names to the list of persons subject to travel ban and asset freeze. Prior to that move, some 
EU officials had once again mentioned targeted economic sanctions and even specified the 
Belarusian enterprises. Nevertheless, EU foreign ministers once again limited themselves to 
individual sanctions.
1) Continued escalation of the conflict. Manifestations of this trend include the extension of 
the list of Belarusian persons subject to EU sanctions, new sharp and insulting statements made by 
both parties, inauguration of Euronest without Belarusian representatives, and joint U.S-Polish 
statements. The trend is also accentuated by the threat of real economic sanctions that the 
Belarusian administration clearly senses (manifested by an anonymous statement by a Presidential 
Administration official about reciprocal measures considered by Belarus’ administration).
2) First attempts to look for ways out of the critical phase of the conflict. Lukashenka’s 
statement about the possible early release of political prisoners is the first public sign indicating the 
willingness of the Belarusian authorities to halt the escalation of the conflict with the EU and get 
back to the non-confrontational communication patterns. Some analysts believe the tendency is 
also manifested in comparatively mild prison sentences given to those accused of staging “mass 
riots”, however, we believe it was a result of some  internal political stratagems rather than an 
attempt to bargain with the West. The EU also seems ready to put an end to the current acute 
phase of the conflict, as European politicians make statements about the importance of resuming 
the dialogue with Belarus (with minimum conditionality – to release political prisoners).
3) Stronger strategic uncertainty. The events in the Mediterranean region and in the Near 
East tend to distract European politicians and diplomats from the eastern neighbor. You get the 
impression that most of the decisions and statements on Belarus are made mechanically, on a “tit 
for tat” basis, but without much determination and long-term planning. The revitalized European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) strategy launched in May can be regarded as another proof of our 
conclusion.
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5Forecast for the near term 
In the next few months, the relations between Belarus and the EU will likely be developing 
following two contradictory trends. On the one hand, Belarus may redouble its efforts to get out of 
the critical phase of its conflict with the West. Sentences have been handed down on political 
opponents, the intimidation mission has been accomplished, and it is now the right time to use 
political prisoners as bargaining chips. Simultaneously with the haggle, official Minsk will be trying 
to convince the EU that Belarus is on the verge of being absorbed by Russia. There will be 
promises to get political process back into the minimum legal framework; there will be hints that 
the opposition might enjoy certain concessions during the forthcoming parliamentary election 
campaign. Finally, the request for a new loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also 
supports the likelihood of this strategy for Belarus.
On the other hand, Belarus is very likely to continue keeping to its no-one-will-bend-us policy. The 
logics of the authorities aimed at minimizing political risks amid the economic crisis will stand 
behind the continuation of the administration’s tough policy on the opposition and civil society. The 
EU will have to respond, and if human rights abuse persists alongside further political crackdown, 
the Council of the European Union may even apply targeted economic sanctions on the country. 
The list of punished enterprises will be as short as possible, though.
The main question is which of the two trends will prevail?
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6Development of Belarus-Russia 
relations
Description of the initial state of relations
Was the forecast made in the previous issue of the monitoring 
accurate?
Description of key events in the period
The relations between Belarus and Russia in the period prior to April and May were mostly 
identified by the escalating currency crisis in Belarus and expectation of loans – a stabilization loan 
from the Russian government and a EurAsEC Bailout Fund loan. The second important factor 
defining the pace and nature of Belarusian-Russian relations was the integration in the framework 
of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Area (CEA).
Amid quite intensive economic relations, political contacts were reserved and cautious – since the 
presidential election in December 2010, the two countries have mostly communicated at the level 
of the governments, whereas the heads of state conversed mainly via the media. Russia once again 
assumed the role of Belarus’ only ally and never gave up the opportunities offered by relations with 
a weak partner. Since the internal political agenda of early 2011 was determined by the trials of 
those engaged in the “December 19 case” (which prevented Belarus from habitually offsetting the 
Russian vector by European rhetoric), and the economic agenda was marked by the deteriorating 
currency crisis (which increased the already very strong dependence on Russia), Belarus had to put 
up with the format and agenda of the bilateral relations carefully selected by the Russian side.
The forecast we provided in the previous issue was accurate in general. Belarus continued its 
cooperation with Russia while remaining dependent on its support both domestically and 
internationally. At the same time, Russia kept pointing at the necessity to respect human rights in 
Belarus and reform the economic system. Alongside with that, there appeared the first hints of 
irritation in official statements of the Belarusian leadership caused by the attempts of the eastern 
partner to apply conditionality when negotiating the stabilization loan.
In the period April 1 through May 31, the Belarusian requests for loans from the EurAsEC Bailout 
Fund and the Russian government became the pivot of Russian-Belarusian relations. On may 11, 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said the Russian government did 
not consider a loan to Belarus, and the EurAsEC Bailout Fund was the only source that Belarus 
could borrow from. However, the decision on the EurAsEC loan was not made during the two 
months we monitor here, despite the official visit of a Russian government delegation to Minsk and 
series of summits of the CIS, EurAsEC and the Customs Union. In the same fashion, the talks over 
privatization of Belarusian assets (Beltransgaz, Belaruskali and MAZ) did not result in any specific 
decisions. 
The visit of the Russian government delegation led by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin became the 
most expected and most disappointing (from Belarus’ viewpoint) event of April and May. On May 
19, Putin conducted all official talks mainly with his Belarusian counterpart Mikhail Miasnikovich, 
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7and had an informal meeting with President Lukashenka late at night, with no press availability. 
The unofficial format of the meeting undermines Lukashenka’s position as the legitimate head of 
state in the eyes of the Belarusian ruling elite. Another hard blow of this kind was the non-
invitation of the Belarusian president to Ukraine to events commemorating the anniversary of the 
Chernobyl disaster, despite the fact that President Dmitry Medvedev did pay a visit to Ukraine.
Also noteworthy are a few unpleasant episodes at the level of the Foreign Ministries, including a 
scandal stirred up in the Russian media over an underground casino in the building of the 
Belarusian Embassy in Moscow and official inquiry of the Russian Foreign Ministry addressed to the 
Belarusian Foreign Ministry about the situation. There were also two statements of the Russian 
Foreign Ministry regarding the arrest and deportation from Belarus of Russian human rights activist 
– such occurrences had never made it into the official agenda before.
Also important was the role of the Russian media in covering the Minsk metro bombing on April 11, 
the economic crisis in Belarus and sentences passed on Lukashenka’s opponents in the presidential 
race. The Russian media in fact became a distributor of alternative information about the 
investigation into the terrorist attack, state of things on the Belarusian currency market and its 
economy as a whole. Importantly, Russian officials’ comments on the situation in Belarus given to 
the local press were very much critical. Aide to the Russian President Arkady Dvorkovich made an 
unambiguous statement that it was the presidential election that led the country into the period of 
instability, including the currency crisis, while Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov condemned the 
sentences given to opposition activists.
Despite the attempts to exhaust the Belarusian leadership with uncertainly about the stabilization 
loan, treatment of President Lukashenka as not quite a legitimate head of state, and media attacks, 
Russia supported Belarus in the OSCE calling for applying the so-called “Moscow mechanism” to its 
ally.
Finally, military cooperation between the two countries was “in the routine mode”.
The events described above indicate the following trends:
1) level of interstate relations remains high despite the fact that the leaders of Belarus and Russia 
are clearly losing mutual trust;
2) positive image of President Lukashenka and his trademark “Belarusian model” are being 
dismantled in the Russian media space;
3) Russian administration seems to be getting more interested in human rights rhetoric and 
protection of Russian citizens’ rights in Belarus; 
4) Russia employs conditionality in economic interaction, especially when negotiating assistance 
and preferences.
Belarus’ dependence on Russian support, both economic and international, will remain. For its part, 
Russia will continue providing support while stipulating an adequate response from the Belarusian 
side and pushing it towards economic reforms, privatization and minimum decency in internal 
affairs. 
Strategic cooperation with a view to enhancing integration associations in the former Soviet Union 
under the patronage of Russia will continue, although the Belarusian authorities might come up 
with unexpected media moves.
The Russian administration will likely keep to its strategy of splitting the Belarusian ruling elite, and 
efforts to dismantle the authority of President Lukashenka and the “Belarusian model” in the 
Russian media space will definitely continue.
Main trends
Forecast for the near term
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8Development of Belarus-China 
relations
Total positive points: 4
Summary index: +4 
Total negative points: 0
Description of the initial state of relations
Was the forecast made in the previous issue of the monitoring 
accurate?
Description of key events in the period
The economic cooperation between the two countries contributes the most to the very high level of 
Belarusian-Chinese political relations by promoting trade relations and facilitating Chinese 
investments in Belarus. This is corroborated by the substantial increase in mutual trade turnover: 
mutual trade amounted to USD 2.2 billion in 2008, the year hit by the global crisis, which compares 
to only USD 34 million in 1990. In the first six months of 2010, Belarusian-Chinese trade turnover 
reached USD 1.068 billion, which represents a 60% increase year-on-year. The two countries 
establish joint ventures in both Belarus and China, and the Belarusian authorities facilitate Chinese 
construction and investment projects in Belarus. 
Not less significant to the Belarusian economy are Chinese loans: the recession-hit economy 
benefited considerably from Chinese tied loans (despite the lending terms) during 2009 and 2010, 
when it was crucial for the country to restructure its economy while preserving the modernization 
pace, and when Belarusian-Russian relations went through an acute phase prior to the presidential 
campaign.
The start of the year 2011 was not marked by hyperactivity in Belarusian-Chinese relations. The 
Chinese loans taken on the eve of the presidential election in late 2010 provided certain support for 
the Belarusian economy, facilitating the creation of new productions and modernization of existing 
manufactories, and further attracting Chinese investments in the country. Furthermore, China’s 
political support at the top level and recognition of the presidential election results by the Chinese 
administration indicated that the two countries shared views and were ready to continue developing 
bilateral relations.
The development of Belarusian-Chinese relations in April and May 2011 was in general in 
accordance with our forecast. As we had predicted, the absence of major tensions in Belarusian-
Russian relations led to a lower intensity of talks with the Chinese side. The period in question may 
be characterized as a continuing moderate growth in trade turnover and development of economic 
relations. There were no meetings at the top level and no developments in the political dialogue.
Belarusian-Chinese relations were limited almost exclusively to joint investment projects. In April, 
republican unitary enterprise Minsk Tractor Plant opened a new tractor production in Chinese 
Harbin. Tractors are assembled at joint Belarusian-Chinese venture Harbin Dong Jing Minsk Tractor. 
In May, Belarus’ Hrodna Region hosted a presentation of the first wind-driven power plant in 
Belarus with a capacity of 1.5 megawatts (MW). Attending the presentation were representatives of 
Chinese HEAG, the Belarusian Energy Ministry, Belenergo concern, Grodnoenergo regional power 
company and local authorities. The wind plant was launched on April 29, 2011 as part of the 
Grodnoenergo power grid and is a pilot project in wind power generation in this country.
4 0
April-May 2011
9At the political level, there was a noteworthy official visit to Belarus of a top-ranking Chinese 
official: Hu Chunhua, the Communist Party Secretary of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, 
paid a visit to Belarus on May 10-11. When in Minsk, he had a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister 
Anatoli Tozik, where the Belarusian official said Belarus was planning to sign agreements with China 
to carry out USD 1.5 billion worth of joint projects. Hu Chunhua later met with the head of the 
Belarusian Presidential Administration Uladzimir Makei; an agreement was reached to strengthen 
cooperation between the Belarusian Presidential Administration and the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China.
The economic relations between the two countries are characterized by a fast and dynamic 
expansion of mutual trade turnover. The impressive growth is primarily attributed to the large 
number of joint projects launched quite recently that involve Chinese loans and investments 
provided mostly for targeted acquisition of Chinese commodities, materials and equipment. This 
factor stands behind an impressive increase in imports from China in the first quarter of 2011, to 
USD 521.3 million, which represents a 90% increase from the first three months of 2010.
In April and May 2011, political developments in Belarus took a backseat to economic issues. The 
ambiguous situation in the country’s economy, characterized by a steady growth in the key 
macroeconomic indicators amid a currency crisis and depreciation of the national currency, made 
the government shift its focus to strategies to address current economic issues in the country, 
which had an impact on Belarusian-Chinese relations
As problems with the foreign exchange deficit escalated, it became a matter of life and death for 
the Belarusian authorities to attract external financing. However, it is from Russia and the IMF that 
Belarus hopes to borrow on a first-priority basis, whereas state loans from China are unlikely at this 
stage. In the past few years, the economic cooperation between the two countries mostly 
envisaged the provision of tied loans for the acquisition of Chinese equipment and construction 
materials to implement joint investment projects in Belarus. We have strong doubts though, that 
loan inflows will increase significantly: China has already invested quite impressively in joint projects 
in Belarus, and before providing new financing for new projects, China would probably like to see 
real progress with projects currently underway.
At the political level, the two countries have no mutual claims at the high and highest levels, a trend 
that is likely to continue. Belarus and China exercise the policy of non-intervention in internal affairs 
of the partner and regularly enjoy each other’s support in international organizations. The two 
countries share the same position on most issues of the international agenda.   
Late May saw another tense phase in Belarusian-Russian relations. Although the intensity of 
contacts with the Chinese side went down at that time, it is very likely that the Belarusian 
authorities will try to give a new impetus to the economic and political cooperation with China. In 
the next four to six weeks, the two countries may ink agreements to start new minor projects; 
some high-level visits are also possible. In the longer term, Belarus may resume talks with China 
over possible sale of state assets to Chinese capital, on condition the economic situation in the 
country remains tense, and talks with Russia and the IMF over stabilization loans are protracted. In 
order to address the deficit of foreign exchange in the country and replenish gold and foreign 
exchange reserves, Belarus may consider selling a minority shareholding in OAO Belaruskali to 
China.
Main trends
Forecast for the near term
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Development of Belarus’ relations 
with “developing countries” 
(Asia, Africa, Latin America)
Total positive points: 9
Summary index: +9 
Total negative points: 0
9
0
Description of the initial state of relations
Description of key events in the period
Belarusian foreign policy targeting developing countries became, on the one hand, a continuation 
of the international economic ties with the Third World inherited from the Belarusian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, quite significant, albeit passive. On the other hand, the developing countries’ 
vector has been fostered because of the political will of the Belarusian authorities in a bid to offset 
the foreign political problems the country has in other regions.
At the same time, Belarusian foreign political efforts in this vector have come across diversification 
difficulties, and in cooperation with some countries, national interests may be replaced by private 
interests of companies and separate individuals who have access to foreign political and economic 
decision-making.
Venezuela. Belarusian First Deputy Prime Minister Uladzimir Siamashka led a Belarusian 
delegation on a working visit to Venezuela on April 26-30.
Zimbabwe. Vice-President of Zimbabwe John Nkomo paid an official visit to Belarus on April 7-9. 
It was the first visit of a Zimbabwean top-ranking official to Belarus. President Lukashenka called it 
a historic event. The Zimbabwean contact is clearly extraordinary and is rather part of the 
ostentatious anti-Western campaign launched by the Belarusian authorities after the presidential 
election than an effort to look for new sources of revenues for the country. In 2010, trade between 
the two countries reached mere USD 2.7 million, including USD 100,000 worth of Belarusian 
exports (up 59% year-on-year, mostly because of supplies of printed goods and tires). At the same 
time, Zimbabwe is a small remote country suffering from a very bad economic crisis, and its 
government does not possess any substantial financial resources to finance potential joint projects 
(in conditions when Belarus, too, is short of money).
It appears that there are no preconditions for developing relations, which the Foreign Ministry must 
have been well aware of in previous years, when new market outlets were sought in the south of 
Africa, among former Soviet allies, such as Angola. Contacts with the Zimbabwean regime will 
automatically cause an adverse response from the UK and United States. John Nkomo himself is 
known as an important personality in the Zimbabwean regime; he is officially denied entry in the 
United States.
Turkey. Minsk hosted on May 17 the 11th round of the Belarusian-Turkish annual political 
consultations between the Foreign Ministries of Belarus and Turkey at the level of deputy ministers. 
Deputy Foreign Minister Fatih Ceylan was received by Belarusian Foreign Minister Siarhei Martynau. 
Consultations of this kind form the basis of the Belarusian-Turkish relations, which are promoted at 
a relatively low level and follow the European model of Belarusian relations rather than the typical 
pattern of relations with developing nations.
Latin America. A Belarusian official delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Siarhei Aleinik paid 
a working visit to Colombia and Ecuador on May 8-13. It was Belarus’ first more or less noticeable 
contact with Colombia. The delegation met with senior officials at the Foreign Ministry, Ministries of 
Mines and Energy, Agriculture, Transport, and Trade, as well as top managers of the key business 
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structures of that country. Notably, the visit took place a few years after Belarus was accused of 
supporting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). 
Oman. A delegation of the Omani Foreign Ministry led by under-secretary Shaikh Ahmed bin Yousef 
bin Obaid al Harthy visited Belarus on May 4-7. A second round of inter-ministerial consultations was 
held. Belarus was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Siarhei Aleinik.
 
On May 24-25, Omani Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs Sayyid Badr Bin Saud Al Busaidi was 
received by “Viktar Lukashenka, Vice-President of Belarus for National Security Affairs and Police. 
The two sides reviewed the relations and discussed matters of cooperation between the two 
countries” (quoted from Omani press reports ). It is not clear to hat extent the visit was connected 
with the military expo held in Minsk at that time. Viktar Lukashenka visited Oman in October 2010 , 
and in May 2010, Belarus’ interior minister paid a visit to that country. Oman, a relatively well-
developed economy, has a huge disproportionate army of 120,000 servicemen (in a country with a 
total population of 2.8 million), spending 7.7% of GDP on military needs annually (2008 data), 
therefore the Belarusian side naturally emphasizes cooperation in defense and internal affairs.
The search for new partners has intensified, which is manifested by numerous visits of official 
delegations led by First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleinik to a number of countries. However, not all 
initiatives fit this scheme, and the contact with Zimbabwe is an excellent example of pure 
adventurism.
The Belarusian government apparently believes the Arab states of the Persian Gulf – Oman, Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates – hold a lot of promise. This must be connected with hopes of Arab 
investments and cooperation in the military sector (which has developed greatly with those 
countries in the past three years).
At the same time, the number of official contacts with developing countries has minimized, which is 
attributed to the difficult internal political situation in Belarus, as well as internal political problems in 
Belarus’ main partners among developing nations (there are not many of them, anyway).For 
instance, in Syria, the local government has been trying to suppress a popular uprising for three 
months now, and the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad government of Iran has been constantly faced with 
the opposition of various political forces over the past six months.
Belarus’ relations with developing countries will keep developing for objective reasons connected 
with the peculiarities of the Belarusian economy and global development trends, whatever regime 
rules in Belarus. Belarus’ southern neighbor Ukraine is a good example of this objective 
engagement; therefore, there are no reasons to expect major modifications in this country’s 
contacts with the developing world.
The tendency towards pragmatism of the Belarusian foreign policy has been somewhat repressed 
because of the confrontation with the West after the 2010 presidential election. Specifically, amid 
rather moderate connections with Iran, Belarus finally made up its mind to open an embassy in 
Indonesia. The development of ties with Arab states of the Persian Gulf should be regarded in the 
same context. The active search for new partners will continue, because the problem of the 
enormous foreign trade deficit persists, and every new country willing to buy Belarusian products 
will become a small victory for the Belarusian government. At the same time, commodities with low 
added value, especially potash fertilizers, will definitely dominate in Belarusian exports to developing 
countries.
Main trends
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Development of Belarus-Ukraine 
relations
Total positive points: 5
Summary index: 0 
Total negative points: -5
Description of the initial state of relations
Description of key events in the period
Belarusian-Ukrainian relations are not burdened with conflicts and are characterized as politically 
neutral. In 2007-2008, Ukraine acted as an intermediary between Belarus and the European Union, 
and in 2008-2010, during the normalization spell in Belarus-EU relations, Ukraine was engaged as 
Belarus’ “attorney” in European structures. After the 2010 presidential campaign and sharp 
deterioration of the relations between official Minsk and the West, Kyiv has once again offered its 
services as a political intermediary; however, no definite response has been given.
Bilateral trade and economic cooperation has been rapidly developing in the past few years, and in 
2010, mutual trade turnover exceeded USD 4.4 billion (USD 2,562.3 million worth of Belarusian 
exports and USD 1,877.6 million worth of imports). Belarusian FDI in the Ukrainian economy stood 
at USD 41.8 million as of October 1, 2010, and Ukraine’s investments in Belarus were at USD 4 
billion.
At the same time, some problems in mutual relations still remain, the key ones being the 
uncompleted process of official legal demarcation of the Belarusian-Ukrainian state border and 
unresolved state debt of Ukraine to Belarus, accumulated prior to 1992 (the debt is estimated at 
USD 134 million).
 
In late March, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko paid a visit to Minsk. His mission 
included two major tasks – to articulate Kyiv’s proposals regarding its role as an intermediary in the 
restoration of Belarus’ relations with the EU and invite President Lukashenka to visit Ukraine, but 
only on April 26, to meet with the presidents of Ukraine and Russia in Chernobyl. This would have 
enabled Ukraine to prevent a meeting between Lukashenka and European Commission President 
Jose Manuel Barroso, who earlier warned Ukraine that he would have to refuse to come to Kyiv if 
Lukashenka were to participate in the nuclear security summit scheduled to be held in Kyiv. 
Hryshchenko held talks with his Belarusian counterpart Siarhei Martynau during his stay in Minsk, 
but did not have a chance to meet with Lukashenka, although the head of state was in Minsk at 
that time.
Ukrainian Ambassador to Belarus Roman Bezsmertny said in an interview with Ukrainian 
independent Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly) that Ukraine never received a response from Belarus 
regarding its intermediation proposal for normalization of Belarus-EU relations.
On April 26, a major diplomatic scandal erupted between Belarus and Ukraine, as President 
Lukashenka accused the Ukrainian leadership of being “lousy”. He was commenting on his non-
participation in the arrangements timed to the anniversary of the Chernobyl accident in Ukraine 
during his visit to Naroulia District.
The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry did not turn a blind eye to the vulgarities and called Lukashenka’s 
statement “unprecedentedly inappropriate” and “insulting”.
However, four week later, on May 19, when meeting with Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, 
Lukashenka did his best to purge the offense and confirmed Belarus’ willingness to develop 
5
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cooperation with Ukraine: “Belarus has always been and remains true to its principles, it has always 
been and remains a reliable ally of brotherly Ukraine.” The Belarusian president asked the Ukrainian 
premier to give these words personally to President Viktor Yanukovych. The incident should not 
have long-term negative repercussions on the relations between the two nations, although it 
reveals both unresolved problems in mutual relations and the irritation of the Belarusian leader at 
the foreign political trap where he found himself after the presidential election. 
Trade turnover between Belarus and Ukraine increased 50% on the year in January-April 2011 to 
reach USD 1.68 billion. Belarusian exports rose almost 60% on the year in that period to USD 991.8 
million, and imports from Ukraine went up 38.7% to USD 686.5 million. The two countries seem to 
be capable of gaining enough pace soon to reach the level of mutual trade recorded in pre-crisis 
2008, when Belarus and Ukraine logged a record-high USD 5 billion mutual trade turnover. 
Apart from the scandal caused by Lukashenka’s statements on April 26, the relations between the 
two countries are developing smoothly; economic relations see a gradual increase in trade turnover. 
Politically, Ukraine is still interested in the role of an intermediary between the EU and Belarus; 
however, the Belarusian side has so far refrained from officially accepting Kyiv’s proposals.
The matter of Venezuelan oil transit and use of the Odessa-Brody pipeline in the direct mode has 
lost its priority status for Minsk and receded into the background as soon as Belarus acceded to the 
Customs Union together with Russia and Kazakhstan.
In the next few months, the Belarusian administration will likely accept the proposal of official Kyiv 
on its intermediation in the normalization of Minsk’s relations with Brussels. This assistance offered 
by Ukraine will be very helpful amid the grave economic crisis and bad need for western financial 
aid. In turn, Ukraine could wish to ultimately resolve the issue of the state border in exchange for 
its mediation services, which may happen as early as the second half of the year.
Main trends
Forecast for the near term
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Supplement
Catalogue of the events based on which experts have calculated 
the relations development index.
Date     Event                                                                                                           Point
April 19-26
early May
May 3
May 11
May 12
May 12
May 12-13
May 23
May 25
May 28
April-May
April-May
April-May
Total
“Chernobyl case”: non-invitation of President Lukashenka to official events in Kyiv 
and following insults hurled at Jose Manuel Barroso
Refusal of the Belarusian authorities to issue entry visas for members of the 
Steering Committee of Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, which had planned 
to hold a working meeting in Minsk
Inaugural meeting of Euronest Parliamentary Assembly without Belarus 
Appeal of a group of MEPs led by Jerzy Buzek to the International Ice Hockey 
Federation (IIHF) to strip Belarus of its right to host the 2014 Men’s World Ice 
Hockey Championships
Statement of a “source” that should the EU approve economic sanctions against 
Belarus, Minsk would expel some of the EU ambassadors out of the country and 
ban foreign trips for 200 opposition activists (tantamount to open diplomatic 
blackmail)
European Parliament resolution on Belarus 
7th Belarusian-Lithuanian economic forum
Decision of the Council of the European Union to extend the list of Belarusian 
persons subject to sanctions
Lukashenka’s statement about the likelihood of the early release of political 
prisoners (start of the open season to bargain political prisoners) 
Joint statement on Belarus of presidents of Poland and the United States (the 
transatlantic dimension of the problem is emphasized) 
Numerous negative (and even insulting) statements of officials representing both 
sides and numerous negative materials in the media
Continued minimum cooperation at the technical level in the scope of European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) small projects 
A series of consultations at the level of Foreign Ministries of Belarus and some EU 
member-states (the Czech Republic, France) and meetings of intergovernmental 
commissions (Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic)
(a minimum communication channel is preserved officially)
-2
-1
- 2
-1
-1
-1
1
- 2
1
-1
-2
1
1
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Date     Event                                                                                                           Point
7
3
- 5
- 1
+3
+2
- 2
- 2
5
Creation of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Area (CEA)
Visit of a governmental delegation
At least three official statements condemning the policy of the Belarusian 
authorities on various issues; adverse materials on events in Belarus in the state 
media 
Protraction of the agreement on the stabilization loan
Support in the OSCE
Defense Ministries’ board session discussing exercise plan for September 2011
Negative statements about the Russian leadership by the head of state and state 
media 
Scandal with the casino, expulsion of Russian human rights activists
May 18
May 18
Entire period
May 18
May
May
Entire period
Entire period
Total
Date     Event                                                                                                           Point
April 13
May 10-11
April 1-March 31
Total
1
2
1
4
Premier and Party Secretary of the State Council of the PRC Wen Jiabao sends 
condolences to Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail Miasnikovich in connection with the 
Minsk metro bombing
Official visit of Hu Chunhua, the Communist Party Secretary of the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region. He meets with Deputy Prime Minister Anatoli Tozik and head of 
the Belarusian Presidential Administration Uladzimir Makei
Infrequent, but regular and exceptionally positive references to mutually beneficial 
cooperation between Belarus and China in the Belarusian mass media
Development of Belarus-Russia 
relations
Development of Belarus-China 
relations
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Date     Event                                                                                                           Point
Date     Event                                                                                                           Point
April 26-30 
April 7-9
May 24-25
Annual address of the 
president  
Total
April 26
April 27 
April 28 
May 19
May 19 
 
Total
2
2
2
3
9
-1
-2
2
-2
2
1
0
Working visit of a Belarusian delegation led by First Deputy Prime Minister Uladzimir 
Siamashka to Venezuela
Visit of Zimbabwean Vice-President John Nkomo to Belarus 
Visit of Omani Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs Sayyid Badr Bin Saud Al 
Busaidi to Belarus 
Positive references to cooperation with Venezuela; sympathy for Libya
Lukashenka’s statement about “lousy” Ukrainian leaders
Lukashenka is not invited to Kyiv Nuclear Safety Summit
Meeting of Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant-General Yury Zhadobin with 
Ukrainian counterpart Mykhailo Yezhel
Joint Belarusian-Ukrainian Air Defense exercise postponed indefinitely  
President Lukashenka meets with Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov in Minsk
President Lukashenka’s statement about cooperation with Ukraine at EurAsEC 
summit: “I assure you that any Ukraine’s proposal that will be beneficial to our 
countries will be supported, approved and implemented without failure.” 
Development of Belarusian relations 
with “developing countries”
Development of Belarus-Ukraine 
relations
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Event ranking scale:
?
5-7 points
?  
4 points
? 3 points
?
2 points
?
 1 point
?
minus 1 point
?
minus 2 points
? minus 3 points
? minus 3 points
? minus 4 points
? minus 5-7 points
Economic and political integration, creation of customs unions, common markets, supranational 
bodies (ratification of relevant treaties) – 
Signing/ratification of a crucial agreement (on cooperation, trade, tariffs, visa-free travel, etc.) –
Top-level visit – 
Visit at the level of ministers, of a parliamentary delegation, negotiations of agreements – 
Positive statements by a head of state, Foreign Ministry, positive parliamentary resolutions, 
positive materials in state or state-controlled media (Sovetskaya Belorussia, BelTA, Zvyazda, 
Belarusian Television – 1st National Channel, ONT) –
Adverse statements by a head of state, Foreign Ministry, in mass media, adverse parliamentary 
resolutions, adverse materials in the state media – 
Protraction of ratification of treaties, non-invitation to international events, failure to provide 
support internationally – 
Infringement of treaties, default on mutual commitments – 
Trade wars, antidumping probes – 
Commodity boycotts, embargoes, recall of diplomats, ambassadors – 
Severance of diplomatic relations, provocations, hostilities – 
April-May 2011
